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Abstract
In this article, cross-border effects of different market design options are
analyzed using Switzerland as a case study, which is strongly interconnected
to larger neighboring markets. An investigation is conducted with an agent-
based model where in one scenario all market designs are represented accord-
ing to the current legislation, and in another, energy-only markets (EOM)
are assumed in all considered countries. The results show that wholesale
electricity prices are highly dependent on the chosen market design and in
the annual average up to 27% higher in the EOM scenario. Due to expected
larger interconnector capacities, this increase is evident in all simulated mar-
kets. Further, the results indicate that the planned market design changes
in the neighboring countries decrease investments in Switzerland. However,
generation adequacy is still guaranteed due to the high Swiss hydropower
storage capacity. Our results suggest that, under the current circumstances,
a domestic mechanism in Switzerland is not required.
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Research highlights
• CRMs are an effective instrument to increase domestic generation ad-
equacy.
• CRMs in neighboring countries result in less investments in the Swiss
market.
• Swiss generation adequacy is secured by a large storage capacity with-
out an own CRM.
• Electricity prices in all countries strongly increase with and without
CRMs.
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European electricity markets are becoming more and more integrated as
a consequence of the internal market guidelines and the so-called Energy
Union strategic framework of the European Commission (1997, 2003, 2009).
The integration of the electricity markets is mainly driven by two intertwined
processes: On the one hand, European markets are more tightly linked by
implicit auctions and combined by the so-called Price Coupling of Regions
run by eight European power exchanges (EPEX SPOT, 2018b). On the
other hand, the physical transmission grid is expanded, and in particular,
the interconnectors will be further enhanced according to the Ten Year Net-
work Development Plan of the European Network of Transmission System
Operators (ENTSO-E, 2018a).
As a result, different cross-border effects can be observed: e.g., market
clearing is determined in a way that energy flows from market areas with
higher prices to those with lower prices resulting in a convergence of elec-
tricity prices in connected market areas given that sufficient interconnection
capacity is available. The price convergence stops if the available interconnec-
tor does not allow a further flow of electricity and, in this case, a certain price
difference remains. However, an additional interconnection line between two
market zones can increase the price assimilation resulting in positive welfare
effects (Ringler et al., 2017).
In the case of a small country neighbored by large markets (asymmetri-
cal market areas), the cross-border price effect can be strong. Therefore, as
a case study, Switzerland serves as a useful example for analyzing the im-
pact of large neighboring markets on a smaller one. Because the analysis by
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Dehler et al. (2016) shows a strong interdependence of wholesale electricity
prices of Switzerland and its neighbors (Austria, France, Italy, and Germany)
due to a tightly connection between the electricity grids. For instance, the
electricity price decline between 2011 and 2016 in the Central Western Euro-
pean countries driven by a renewable expansion and low prices for EU ETS
emission allowance resulted in lower prices also in the Swiss electricity mar-
ket. This price decline can be welcomed from the consumer perspective but
has a lowering effect on producer rent and the profitability of power plants
(Bublitz et al., 2017; Hirth, 2018; Kallabis et al., 2016). This might yield not
only for thermal capacities but also for the dominant hydropower plants in
Switzerland.
These developments are expected to intensify in the near future, as some
neighboring countries changed the design of their wholesale electricity mar-
kets in the past few years, which can put additional pressure on Swiss
wholesale electricity prices. For instance, Germany is planning to intro-
duce a strategic reserve (SR) to ensure generation adequacy in scarcity times
(BMWi, 2017). Also, France implemented a capacity remuneration mech-
anism (CRM), a decentralized capacity market, to ensure generation ade-
quacy and incentivize demand-side management (DSM) measures in peak
load times (Bublitz et al., 2018). As the yearly traded volume in the French
and German electricity markets is considerably larger than in other Euro-
pean markets, their decisions strongly influence the neighboring markets,
especially the comparatively small ones. In this context, the question arises
as to whether the Swiss market also requires new instruments to ensure long-
term generation adequacy by incentivizing national (re-)investments.
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Therefore, the goal of this study is to investigate the cross-border ef-
fects of CRMs on electricity prices, investments, and thus on the long-term
generation adequacy in such connected market areas by applying a power
market model based on agent-based simulation using Switzerland as a case
study. This approach allows the consideration of individual decisions of mar-
ket players and the analysis of market equilibria based on these decisions.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 summa-
rizes the current literature on cross-border effects with regard to CRMs and
deduces the research gap in this context. Section 3 describes the applied
simulation approach focusing on modeling CRMs in an electricity market
model. The results, including investments, price impact, and the generation
adequacy, are discussed in Section 4. Finally, in Section 5, the methodology
is critically evaluated, and the main conclusions as well as policy implications
are derived in Section 6.
2. Literature review
One of the difficulties encountered in the analysis of cross-border effects
is the large number of possible influences, such as the number and the market
size of the countries considered. In addition, the levels of competition and the
respective market designs can influence the results (Meyer and Gore, 2015).
Thus, it is difficult to derive general conclusions. This fact might serve
as an explanation of why the literature predominantly focuses on a single
market scenario, and the research on spillover effects of capacity remuneration
mechanisms is lagging behind (Lorenczik, 2017). However, without a sound
theoretical framework on cross-border effects, ensuring generation adequacy
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at a regional level in an efficient manner remains a major challenge (Glachant
et al., 2017). This is further complicated by the fact that cross-border effects
can emerge in a non-linear manner (Boffa et al., 2010).
A question frequently examined in the literature is whether free-riding
occurs if a neighboring country introduces a CRM. For example, Bhagwat
et al. (2014, 2017) study cross-border effects in two symmetrical market areas
differing only in their design. Whereas an EOM does not limit the effective-
ness of the neighboring capacity market or SR, vice versa, two effects can
be observed: On the one hand, the consumers in the EOM are free-riding
on the consumers in the neighboring market where a CRM is implemented.
On the other hand, the dependence of the EOM on the neighboring mar-
kets is increasing. Similarly, Meyer and Gore (2015) find that the unilateral
implementation of a CRM, either in the form of reliability options or a SR,
weakens investment incentives in the neighboring market. Cepeda and Fi-
non (2011) analyze the cross-border effects of three different market designs
(EOM, price-capped EOM, forward capacity market). They find that in the
long-term, the market area with an EOM does not benefit from the adjacent
market area where a price-capped forward capacity market is implemented,
and even negative externalities can arise in the form of a higher average price
and lower reliability.
Lorenczik (2017) observes that the negative effect of price caps intensi-
fies if a market is connected to neighboring markets and, thus, generation
capacity and welfare further decrease. Yet, vice versa, national price caps do
not seem to have a significant adverse effect on neighboring countries. Con-
trary to other studies, it is claimed that capacity payments do not exert a
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significant positive effect on the security of supply in neighboring countries.
Not only between a market with and without a CRM, spillover effects
can occur, but also between markets with different CRMs. In a scenario
where a SR is introduced in one market and a capacity market in the other,
Bhagwat et al. (2014, 2017) observe negative spillover effects of the capacity
market on the SR resulting in, e.g., a lower reserve margin in the market with
the SR. Elberg (2014) investigates two symmetrical market areas in which
either a SR or capacity payments have been implemented. On an isolated
basis, both mechanisms lead to an efficient outcome. However, in a combined
evaluation, the SR shows worse results due to redistribution effects, as the
consumer welfare decreases in the area of the SR, whereas it increases in the
adjacent area.
In some cases, CRMs are also investigated in real-world case studies.
For example, Ochoa and Gore (2015) investigate the welfare and security
of supply in the Finnish electricity market under consideration of potential
benefits and risks arising from the connection to the Russian market. In case
the electricity imports from Russia were reliably available, the expansion of
transmission capacities would be recommended. However, as their reliability
is doubtful, it is recommended to build up national generation capacities and
maintain a SR. In another analysis, Ochoa and van Ackere (2015b) examine
cross-border effects in Colombia–Ecuador and France–Great Britain. They
conclude that the potential benefits are strongly linked to market complemen-
tarity and that policy measures to exploit these benefits without distorting
market signals must be carefully evaluated, especially if large seasonal storage
capacities exist, which might be used extensively during shortage situations
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in the neighboring country and subsequently are unavailable for national us-
age. In a follow-up study, Ochoa and van Ackere (2015a) once again analyze
the markets of Colombia–Ecuador and find that the relative market sizes and
the size of transmission capacities have a significant influence on potential
cross-border benefits.
One of the remaining key challenges in evaluating generation adequacy is
to assess the contribution of neighboring countries in order to avoid over- or
undercapacity. Mastropietro et al. (2015) investigate possibilities to remove
barriers preventing foreign participants in Europe from participating in ex-
ternal capacity mechanisms without reducing the short-term efficiency of the
electricity market. They propose that capacities should be procured via zonal
auctions, which take into account the maximum transmission capacity of the
interconnection, and that capacities should not be allowed to participate in
different national CRMs. Finon (2014) investigates the differences between
explicit and implicit cross-border participation. In the long term, he states
that excluding cross-border participants does result in neither a significantly
lower efficiency nor a distortive effect on the competition. From a European
perspective, however, the explicit consideration of capacities can be advan-
tageous. Furthermore, it can be noted that the introduction of a CRM in a
neighboring country considerably increases the pressure to introduce a na-
tional mechanism, in order to protect the market against possible harmful
consequences (Bhagwat et al., 2017; Gore et al., 2016). Another possibility
is to focus on supranational coordination (Hawker et al., 2017; Osorio and
van Ackere, 2016; Neuhoff et al., 2016).
At this point, it needs to be emphasized that the uncoordinated intro-
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duction of CRMs in a tightly interconnected continental electricity system,
such as the European system, can distort price signals and even impair the
security of supply in a neighboring market. However, despite existing re-
search, cross-border effects of CRMs have not yet been fully explored and, in
particular, the impact on tightly connected real-world markets remains to a
large extent unknown. Therefore, to deepen the understanding and identify
adverse cross-border effects of CRM, a case study is carried out, in which
the Swiss electricity market is analyzed. The Swiss market has two unusual
characteristics that make it particularly suitable for the analysis: On the
one hand, as a small market, it is strongly influenced by large neighboring
markets (Dehler et al., 2016) and, on the other hand, it possesses mainly
complementary and opportunity cost-based generation technologies, i.e., a
significant share of hydro storage capacities (Swiss Federal Office of Energy,
2018a). As the opportunity costs are often based on results from neighboring
markets, the cross-border influence is particularly strong.
3. The agent-based modeling approach
In this section, the methodology for analyzing the cross-border effects of
different market designs is presented. To this end, an agent-based simulation
model with the focus on Switzerland and adjacent countries has been devel-
oped further and applied (Section 3.1–3.3). Section 3.4 outlines the modeling
of CRMs that are newly introduced or have already been implemented in the
considered market areas. In order to take into account the specific character-
istics of the Swiss electricity market, extensions had to be made in particular
for hydropower plants, which are presented in Appendix A.
9
3.1. Overview
In order to model the regarded electricity markets, an agent-based simu-
lation approach is used and extended (e.g., Ringler et al., 2017). To analyze
electricity markets in a dynamic environment, agent-based simulation has
already been applied widely (Ventosa et al., 2005; Weidlich and Veit, 2008;
Guerci et al., 2010) as it offers the possibility of integrating the individ-
ual market participants with a high level of detail (Tesfatsion, 2003). The
behavior of the agents can be best described with the concept of bounded ra-
tionality (Simon, 1986), which states that all decisions are made on the basis
of the agents’ limited knowledge about the present and imperfect informa-
tion about the future. Therefore, the result of the model is not a long-term,
optimal equilibrium determined by a central decision-maker, but depends on
the decisions of all agents, who pursue individual strategies to reach their
goals. Thereby, the market development under consideration of the complex
interactions can be investigated even in non-equilibrium situations, and new
insights can be gained (Epstein, 1999). For instance, this also means that
the demand may not be met by the supply capacity as agents can invest less
than the required capacity in the case of an expected negative net present
value (NPV) of new investments. Besides, it is also possible for power plant
operators to submit strategic bids above the variable costs.
In the applied agent-based bottom-up simulation model, individual agents
are major national and international actors representing the main generation
companies. The model integrates the short-term dispatching of generation
units with an hourly time resolution (Section 3.2) and the long-term capacity

















Figure 1: Schematic overview over the agent-based simulation model. The different mod-
ules such as day-ahead market, capacity market and market coupling are presented. Also
the main input data, i.e., load profiles, power plants and net transfer capacities (NTCs)
are shown.
overview of the model is illustrated in Figure 1.
3.2. Day-ahead market
In order to analyze in particular the interactions of the different market
areas, each market is implemented as an optional module and interconnected
to its neighboring markets via the available transmission capacities. In recent
years in Europe, market coupling has made steady progress and, in 2015,
a flow-based approach was introduced (EPEX SPOT, 2016), replacing the
ATC-based approach used before (European Energy Exchange [EEX], 2011).
As cross-border effects are strongly influenced by the way market coupling
is implemented, an algorithm was chosen that resembles the actual market
design and can be divided into the following steps:


















Figure 2: As sufficient transmission capacity between the two interconnected markets is
available, prices converge to PABMC and the economic welfare increases. However, this does
not imply that each market participant is better off. For example, consumers in market
A have to pay a higher price than they would pay without market coupling.
tor to submit bids for the day-ahead market for each hour of the following
day. The bids are based on the variable costs of the generation capacity
units but can also include a markup in scarcity hours (Keles et al., 2016a).
Next, all national bids are submitted to a central operator that applies a
welfare-maximizing market clearing algorithm subject to the available inter-
connection capacity as well as the balance of supply and demand in each
market area.1 As shown in Figures 3 and 2, the algorithm leads to a con-
vergence of market prices and, in the case of sufficiently large transmission
capacities, identical prices.
1For further details, for example, the mathematical formulation of the market clearing



















Figure 3: As there is lower-cost generation capacity available in Market A, Market B
imports electricity. Thereby, a smaller part of its local demand DBMC has to be covered
by its own supply SB and the price in market B decreases. In market A, the situation
is exactly the opposite. Generation capacities from market A serve an overall higher
demand DAMC , thus more expensive capacities are required, and the price in market A
rises. However, as only insufficient transmission capacity is available, no uniform price is
reached, but a price difference of ∆P remains.
3.3. Capacity expansion
The model contains an investment planning module, which is executed
once a year within the chosen time horizon. Thereby, different investment
options of flexible power plants are compared according to a certain economic
criterion, e.g., the net present value. Potential revenues for power plants can
be generated from selling electricity in energy spot markets as well as from
participating in different CRMs (e.g., central capacity market, SR) depending
on the respective market area configuration. Investment agents in all market
areas evaluate different power plant options. Data and assumptions on which
the prediction is based are future electricity demand as well as fuel and
emission price developments in the following years (see Section 4.1). Based
on these data, a price forecast is firstly made for future prices in the respective
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market areas. Each agent a from all market areas calculates the NPV for
each available investment option j according to Equation 1.







h,t,a − cvarh,t,j, 0}
(1 + i)t
∀j, a (1)
Calculation of the NPV is based on the investment payment I0, the eco-
nomic lifetime n, interest rate i, fixed costs cfix price forecast pprog and vari-
able costs cvar.
Investment options are predetermined exogenously based on the scenario
(Table 2) and represent a specific flexible power plant type, such as a gas
turbine. The options include all economic (e.g., investment I0 or invest-
ment horizon n) and technological parameters (e.g., efficiency, net capacity)
that vary over the simulation period. In addition, future technological devel-
opments such as carbon capture systems are taken into account in various
investment options.
For calculation of the expected annual revenues of the spot market, an
hourly electricity price forecast pprog is used. The price forecast for the cal-
culations works analogously to the determination of the spot market price
by applying a welfare maximizing market coupling. The variable costs cvar
for each hour h of the year t are deducted from pprog. As a power plant only
produces if at least the variable costs are covered, all negative cash flows
are excluded (neglecting must-run conditions, start-up costs, and minimum
downtimes). For calculation of the variable costs, fuel prices, and carbon
certificate prices are assumed to be the same in all market areas.
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A list with the NPV values of all power plant options is created for all
agents A from all market areas. From this, the option j∗ is selected that
reaches the highest positive NPV∗ (according to Equation 2) of all agents.
j∗ = max NPVj,a ,∀j : NPVj > 0 & a ∈ A (2)
Each investment increases the totally installed capacity and thus influ-
ences prices. Consequently, no investor would make an investment with an
initial positive NPV, if it affects prices to such an extent that the own new in-
vestment becomes unprofitable. Therefore, a new price forecast is calculated
after each investment decision for option j∗. Subsequently, j∗ is revaluated
with the new price forecast. If the NPV∗ of j∗ is still positive, the agent
invests in option j∗. If the NPV∗ of j∗ is not positive, a new price forecast is
calculated with the option with the second highest NPV and so on until an
investment is made. If no investment with a positive NPV is available, the
algorithm terminates, and no further investments are made in the simulation
year. The investment process is repeated every year of the model horizon.
3.4. Modeling capacity remuneration mechanisms
In recent years, some countries have introduced CRMs, thus making it
necessary to extend the PowerACE model with this very feature. PowerACE
is able to consider SR and other types of CRMs (Keles et al., 2016a; Bublitz
et al., 2015). For this analysis, only the SR for Belgium and Germany as
well as a decentralized capacity market for France and a central capacity
market for Italy are applied (see Figure 4). The payments of the modeled
mechanisms are also taken into account for the NPV calculation described
15
Central buyer Strategic reserve De-central obligation No CRM Not regarded
Figure 4: In the model, the following countries are included with the already implemented





Every year, the national transmission system operators in Belgium and
Germany organize an auction to procure the necessary capacity for the SR.
In order to participate, a generation unit must be available within a cer-
tain time, i.e., after a cold start time of less than 10 hours. The selection
of generation capacity is determined by the submitted capacity price with-
out considering electricity generation costs. Generators offer their capacities
based on their respective annual fixed and opportunity costs. The opportu-
nity costs correspond to the expected lost profits from the other markets, as
contracted entities are prohibited from participating in other markets. This
restriction remains in effect even after expiry of the contract term, and hence
obeys the no-way-back rule. Once a power plant is part of the SR, its op-
erational control is carried out by the transmission system operator. The
reserve is used only in extreme situations when no balance between supply
and demand can be achieved. In this case, the operator offers the reserve in
the day-ahead market at the maximum allowed price. The generation units
are activated in the order of their variable costs: First, the unit with the
lowest variable costs is dispatched, then the more expensive ones. The owner
receives a recompensation for the costs additionally incurred during the op-
eration time (e.g., fuel and carbon costs). For further details regarding the
implementation of the SR refer to Bublitz et al. (2015).
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Capacity markets
France The implementation of the French capacity market (RTE, 2017),
which was particularly developed for this investigation, is described in detail
in Zimmermann et al. (2017) or Kraft (2017). Firstly, the reference capacity
demand (based on the future annual peak demand) including an exogenously
defined security factor is calculated. Depending on the reference capacity, the
capacity obligations of the obligated parties (i.e., supply companies and large
consumers) are specified depending on their shares in total peak demand, so
that each obligated party has to cover the amount of its own demand.
Secondly, the supply price of the generation capacities is determined due
to the expected income on the electricity market for each generation unit
based on the yearly difference costs. Difference costs are defined as the gap
between the yearly income on the energy market and the required income
to break even a generation unit’s profitability. Finally, annual payments are
derived due to the capacity obligations and the difference costs of the supply
units.
Italy The central capacity market with capacity options, applied, e.g.,
in Italy, is based on the Forward Capacity Market, which is currently im-
plemented in the market area of the US system operator ISO New England
(2014), and is adjusted to the Italian market area, which is outlined in Keles
et al. (2016a). In the model, with a lead time of four years, the regulator
agent determines the conventional capacity requirement which is calculated
based on the forecasted peak load in the respective year of execution mi-
nus the contribution of RES to the generation adequacy (on the basis of
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predefined capacity credits). The regulator, as the central agent, buys the
whole capacity for the market area in the model including all reserve margins
based on a certain demand curve (Cramton and Stoft, 2005). Afterwards,
the generation units receive this payment.
3.5. Output
One of the main outputs of the model within this article are the hourly
spot electricity prices for each market area. These electricity prices reflect
both the national situation (e.g., market design, demand, and generation
mix) as well as developments in interconnected markets (e.g., welfare effects,
cross-border flows). Therefore, determining the profitability of existing and
new generation units is also a result of this study. Given the possibility
of varying model parameters (e.g., with certain CRM activated) and input
data (e.g., fuel and carbon prices varied), the agent-based simulation model
PowerACE is suitable to analyze a range of different scenarios. Several in-
vestigations have been conducted by the authors in the past (e.g., Keles
et al., 2016b) using the PowerACE modeling approach. In order to analyze
cross-border effects, the PowerACE model has been improved with regard
to the methodology and the spatial resolution. The methodological exten-
sions are inter alia the implementation of the French capacity market as well
as the hydropower dispatch module (Appendix A), in particular for Austria
and Switzerland. Furthermore, the long-term price forecast, which is used
in particular in the investment planning module, as well as the investment
planning module itself have been improved regarding the consideration of
market coupling effects. Geographical extensions include the market areas of
Switzerland, Italy, and Austria, whereas, before the extension, the model was
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limited to the Central Western European (CWE) market area. (See Ringler
et al., 2017; Keles et al., 2016a)
4. Case study: Switzerland
4.1. Input data
In this section, a scenario framework will be defined in accordance with
the modeling approach (Section 3). Therefore, assumptions are made for the
development of electricity demand, fuel and carbon certificate prices, and the
costs of generation technologies.
This requires the selection and processing of large amounts of data (Table
1) to be used in the scenario runs (Table 2). The EU Reference Scenario
(European Commission, 2016) was used to derive fuel and carbon prices. All
of the flexible fossil power plants in the modeled areas are based on the S&P
Global Platts (2016) power plant database. Regarding the market coupling,
the trading capacities between the market areas are derived from NEP (2018)
and ENTSO-E (2018a). Investments in new flexible power plants as well as
assumptions of fixed and additional variable costs (in addition to the costs
of fuel and carbon certificates) for the power plants are based on Schröder
et al. (2013). Due to the high resolution of the model, hourly RES feed-in
and electricity demand profiles (year 2015) are used as initial data taken
from ENTSO-E (2018b) and Swissgrid (2015). The yearly development of
the demand and the RES feed-in volume is taken from European Commission
(2016) for the EU countries and from Prognos AG (2012) (Scenario C&E) for
Switzerland. All profiles are scaled according to the underlying development
in the modeled years. Hydropower plants play a crucial role in the Swiss
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Table 1: In this table, an overview is provided over the main data used in all scenarios.
Input data type Resolution Switzerland Other countries
Conventional
power plants
Plant/unit level Based on S&P Global Platts (2016),
extended with own assumptions
Fuel and carbon
prices
Yearly European Commission (2016)
Investment
options
Yearly Schröder et al. (2013)
Transmission
capacity














electricity market. The aggregated capacities of hydro river, seasonal hydro
storage, and pumped storage power plants kept constant at 16.6 GW in total
and are taken from Swiss Federal Office of Energy (2018d).
In order to examine the effects of the CRMs in detail, various scenarios
and sensitivities are calculated using the agent-based model for a time horizon
from 2015 to 2050 to evaluate the individual market designs for the simulated
market areas. These are shown in Table 2.
4.2. Price development
The EOM scenario is characterized by the fact that only EOMs are imple-
mented in all of the modeled markets. This means that all income from flexi-
ble power plants is generated by the sale of electrical energy on the wholesale
electricity market. The CRM Policies scenario describes the currently imple-
mented and decided market designs in the modeled market areas/countries.
It is a close-to-reality representation of the circumstances prevailing at the
time this investigation was being processed.
21
Table 2: The applied market designs for the different scenarios for each country are de-
scribed. Whereas CRM Policies represents a scenario with currently implemented poli-
cies, the counterfactual EOM scenario and DE Strategic sensitivity are used to analyze
the effects of CRMs. // EOM = Energy-only market, SR = Strategic reserve, DCM =
Decentralized capacity market, CB = Central buyer.
CRM Policies EOM DE Strategic reserve sensitivity
Austria EOM EOM EOM
Belgium SR EOM SR
France DCM EOM DCM
Germany SR (5 GW) EOM SR (2 GW)
Italy CB EOM CB
Netherlands EOM EOM EOM
Switzerland EOM EOM EOM
4.2.1. Price validation
To verify the results, a short validation based on historical prices is carried
out in advance. Table 3 shows the comparison of real electricity wholesale
prices, of the years 2015 and 2016 (EPEX SPOT, 2018a), and the prices that
are calculated in the PowerACE simulation. In some cases, there are larger
deviations. Concerning the German price deviation, it has to be mentioned
that several market areas around Germany (e.g., Denmark, Poland) have not
yet explicitly been modeled in PowerACE. Although the exchange flows with
these markets are considered via static exchange, only the hourly volume ef-
fects, but not price effects of these flows are taken into account. Calculations
with all neighboring market areas of Germany in PowerACE show that the
mean value of deviations was below 2 EUR/MWh for Germany and Austria
in the years 2015 and 2016. Furthermore, the carbon certificate prices in this
study are derived from the EU Reference Scenario (European Commission,
2016), but in reality, the carbon certificate prices were lower in these years,
which also explains some of the higher electricity prices in the simulation.
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The error between simulated and historical series is quite small for the Swiss
and French electricity prices. In general, the price validation delivers suffi-
ciently good results except for Italy. The main reason for the deviation in
Italy is that there is no internal splitting of Italy into different price zones in
the model as it is the case in reality. Therefore, no domestic grid restrictions
in Italy are taken into account that would shorten the market in the different
zones and lead to higher prices in the model. Higher prices in the different
zones in Italy lead to a higher average than in the case of considering Italy
as an unique market zone.
Table 3: Price validation of the PowerACE model: Comparing day-ahead wholesale his-
torical and simulated prices. Simulated prices are similar in both scenarios for 2015 and
2016 and stated in EUR/MWh. Source: EPEX SPOT (2018a)
[EUR/MWh] 2015 2016
hist. sim. hist. sim.
Switzerland 40.30 43.41 37.88 38.29
Germany/Austria 31.63 43.51 28.98 38.48
France 38.48 39.07 36.75 34.17
Italy-North* 52.71 42.64 42.67 38.01
* The national average price (PUN) in Italy was 52.31 EUR/MWh in 2015 and 42.78
EUR/MWh in 2016.
4.2.2. Wholesale prices in the scenarios
Looking at the simulated wholesale prices in the EOM (Figure 5) and in
the CRM Policies scenario (Figure 6), it is immediately visible that the prices
in France are clearly below the prices for all other market areas until approx-
imately 2035. The reason for this is the high proportion of nuclear power
plants in France, which are not affected by rising carbon certificate prices
and set the prices at a lower level in France due to their low marginal costs.
Due to the limited trading capacities between the countries, the other mar-
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ket areas can only partly profit from these low prices. Moreover, the price-
increasing effects of exchange trades with Spain and Great Britain (which
are connected to the French grid and tend to have a higher price level) are
missing in the model due to the chosen system boundaries. This leads to
large deviations between the French prices and the other market prices until
trading capacities between the modeled countries are substantially increased.
In addition, few new nuclear power plants are built in France during the time
horizon of the analysis (only towards the end of the simulation period), but
rather gas-fired power plants, which in terms of prices align with the other
market areas. This can be observed in both scenarios. Therefore, from 2035
onwards, prices in the EOM scenario rise significantly due to scarcity prices
within several hours caused by less installed capacity and increasing carbon
certificate prices. The average prices in the model in the years 2041 and 2043
are thus over 120 EUR/MWh in the EOM scenario. In the following years,
however, the average price is observed to fall again, because these prices
again incentivize new investments.
In all modeled market areas, prices are developing in a similar way. Only
Italy has average prices slightly below the other areas considered from 2035
onwards. These differences are due to the still limited exchange capacities to
neighboring countries together with high RES production in Italy, so that it
is no longer possible to export more electricity in the corresponding hours.
E.g., in the year 2043, Italy on the average generates 39 GW from RES in
the hours with fully used export capacities. This RES production lowers
the average wholesale price. From 2035, the picture is similar for the CRM
Policies scenario as in the EOM scenario, with the difference that the average
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Figure 5: The simulated wholesale prices in the EOM scenario show a strong increase.
With the decommissioning of nuclear power plants, French prices rise to a similar level as
in other market areas.
prices are significantly lower. The absolute price deviations of the wholesale
market prices of the different scenarios are at the beginning (until 2023) only
caused by the introduction of the SR in Germany because the power plants
will be taken out of the market. Until 2035, the prices of both scenarios
are almost the same, the EOM average prices are even slightly below the
average prices of the CRM Policies scenarios. From 2035 onwards, however,
prices deviate significantly due to the occurrence of scarcity caused by an
insufficient supply in various market areas in the EOM scenario (Figure 7).
The prices remain lower (see Figure 6) due to sufficient capacities in the
CRM Policies scenario.
For Switzerland, this deviation of the average prices is shown in Figure
7. The maximum difference between the yearly average prices of the EOM
scenario and the CRM Policies scenario is more than 27 EUR/MWh in some
years after 2035. This high price difference is, of course, due to the higher
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Figure 6: The simulated prices in the CRM Policies scenario also show a strong increase,
although the overall level is lower than in the EOM scenario.






























Figure 7: In the long term, the simulated prices for the CRM Policies scenario are lower
than in the EOM scenario as Swiss consumers benefit from increased abroad generation
capacities.
flexible capacities in France and Italy, which are available at any time. The
neighboring countries also profit from the high installed capacity that is
signaled by fewer hours in which the market cannot be cleared (Table 5).
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Regarding the prices and the capacity development, the picture is am-
bivalent for Switzerland. On the one hand, less will be invested in the CRM
Policies scenario, prices are lower than in the EOM scenario(see Section 4.3),
and Swiss hydropower offers enough capacity at all hours to ensure that the
wholesale market can always be cleared (see Section 4.4). However, on the
other hand, compared to the neighboring countries, the EOM scenario does
not have many hours in which the market does not provide sufficient supply,
but at significantly higher prices. However, CRMs also causes costs (and
could lead to inefficient investments), but this is not relevant to Switzer-




In the EOM scenario, the total installed conventional capacity across all
countries decreases, with the exception of Austria. This can be explained
by overcapacities, especially in Germany, and by better counterbalancing
effects across the various market areas. For instance, market coupling and
expansion of trading capacities allow larger volumes of energy exchanges
across countries. However, there is a short-term increase in capacity in 2030
and 2035 in the model runs (Table 8). This can essentially be explained
by the closure of large nuclear capacities in France, so that with a (purely
hypothetical) assumption of the maximum operating life of nuclear power
plants being 50 years, starting in 2027, their total capacity shrinks from
over 60 GW to less than 10 GW within 15 years (excluding new investments)
(Zimmermann et al., 2017). This leads to raised prices in the forecast module
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in consecutive years and in some cases to anticipated investments in new
power plants. However, after 2035, the capacity falls back below the level of
before 2030 both in France and in all countries considered. After 2035, the
reason for the reduction of the installed conventional capacities is the growth











































































































Figure 8: The main differences between the EOM and in the CRM Policies scenario can
be seen in France and Italy. There, the introduction of capacity markets leads to higher
capacities from 2025 onwards and to a more constant conventional capacity development
than in the EOM scenario.
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Table 4: Investments in Switzerland in new flexible power plants in the the different
scenarios in [MW].
[MW] Gas Combined Cycle Open Cycle Gas Turbine
Year EOM CRM Policies EOM CRM Policies
2020-2024 - - - 800
2025-2029 1200 - - -
2030-2034 800 1200 - -
2035-2039 400 - - -
However, Austria is an exception, because of the newly introduced market
splitting between Austria and Germany (since October 2018) and the merely
static exchange with the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia without
price effects. The latter issue could distort prices to such an extent that
investments in Austria appear profitable in the model because of high price
forecasts due to low installed capacity. For better illustration, Figure 8 shows
the conventional capacity development without RES while Figure B.15 (in
the Appendix) depicts capacity development with dedicated RES develop-
ment.
Figure 9 shows capacity development in Switzerland, including all RES
capacities, broken down by the respective generation technologies. While
the nuclear power plants will be completely phased out by 2035 due to the
assumed maximum lifetime of 50 years, the capacity will be replaced by new
investments in combined cycle gas turbines (CCGTs) (Table 4) up to a total
capacity of 2.4 GW. However, if the nuclear power plants are operated for a
longer period, this picture may change.
The increase in installed RES capacity in Switzerland is mainly caused
by the growth in solar power plants, due to the input data. The installed









































Seasonal storage River Pumped Storage PV Wind


































































Figure 9: Due to the complete decommissioning of nuclear power plants, the capacities
are being replaced by new investments in gas-fired combined cycle power plants and the
expansion of renewable energies, especially photovoltaics.
solar from 650 MW in 2020 to 13 900 MW in 2050. As a result, the total
generation capacity rises from over 21 GW in 2020 to over 36 GW in 2050 in
the EOM scenario.
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4.3.2. CRM Policies scenario
For the study of CRM market designs, availability factors of 6% for wind
and1% for PV were assumed at all hours. In particular in Italy, conventional
power plants are considered with a 90% availability in the CRM and for
the capacity market auction, an additional reserve of 3% of the peak load is
implemented. For France, a security factor of 1.03 as well as capacity credits
for wind (20%) and solar (5%) defined by RTE (2017), are applied for the
first years. For Germany, the SR (‘Kapazitätsreserve’) allocates 5 GW. In
all market areas, DSM (interruptible load) capacities in the amount of 2%
of the maximal peak load for a price of 700 EUR/MWh are assumed.
In the CRM Policies scenario, all model results are generated considering
already implemented or proposed CRMs. Therefore, the introduction of the
capacity markets in France and Italy leads to significantly higher capacities
and to a more constant conventional capacity development in these countries
compared to the EOM scenario (see Figure 8). In the scenario with CRMs,
the increasing demand for flexible generation capacity is driven by the peak
demand plus potential security margins, e.g., defined by the regulatory au-
thority.
RES can have a mitigating effect on the rise of the conventional capacity
demand caused by the CRMs. However, due to the fluctuating behavior of
RES, they may only participate to a certain extent in the capacity market
(or by reducing peak residual demand). This also depends on the respec-
tive design or parameterization of the CRMs. However, as a result of the
capacity credits, the sum of the required and installed conventional capacity
corresponds to almost peak demand in the overall market area due to the
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CRM configuration.
For illustration, Figure 8 shows the capacity development in Switzer-
land and the neighboring countries while Figure B.15 (in the Appendix)
depicts the development together with the RES capacities. In Table 4, the
investments in new power plants are listed. Investments are made purely in
gas-fired power plants (2 GW) in the CRM Policies scenario. However, in-
vestments not only in CCGTs, but also in open-cycle gas turbines (OCGTs)
are part of the results. The OCGTs outperform CCGTs in terms of capital
costs. Therefore, the agents choose the OCGTs if the power plant is mainly
built to provide reserve or if the power plant is dispatched only for a small
number of hours in the spot market with low average market prices. Figure
9 shows the total development of Swiss capacities, i.e., including RES. As
a result, the total capacity will rise from over 21 GW (in 2020) to almost
36 GW in 2050.
4.4. Generation adequacy
The generation adequacy is illustrated here in the form of hours and ex-
pected volumes where the electricity spot market cannot be cleared normally.
Table 5 summarizes and aggregates the number of hours in which the spot
market in the PowerACE model cannot generate a feasible market result with
usual generation capacities. Hence, either immediately-switchable capacity is
necessary for market clearing (DSM) or the market cannot be cleared due to
insufficient supply (“No market clearing, therefore price is 3000 EUR/MWh
(EPEX SPOT, 2018a)). However, this does not necessarily indicate black-
or brownouts, because there is, for instance, still the available control reserve
capacity. The availability of DSM potential is assumed to be 2 % of the peak
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Table 5: Cumulated hours with the use of DSM or no market clearing in the simulated
time horizon from 2020 to 2050 in the EOM scenario.
Unit CH DE FR IT AT
EOM scenario
DSM usage [h] 846 988 982 725 834
No market clearing [h] 0 492 541 308 2
Expected load not served [MW] 0 5337 5470 3992 1127
CRM Policies scenario
DSM usage [h] 14 165 0 0 88
No market clearing [h] 0 42 0 0 17
Expected load not served [MW] 0 1936 0 0 1042
demand in all market areas. Table 5 indicates the accumulated number of
hours with the use of DSM or with no market clearing for both scenarios.
Furthermore, the expected energy not covered in the case of a non-feasible
market result in the spot market is specified in the same table.
In Switzerland, the lower installed generation capacity in the CRM Poli-
cies scenario does not increase the number of hours in which the market
cannot be cleared or the hours when DSM is needed to clear the market
successfully. On the contrary, the number of hours with DSM dispatch even
falls due to higher flexible capacity in the neighboring countries compared to
the EOM scenario. In the EOM scenario, the market can be cleared at all
hours, which is caused by the use of DSM and the high hydropower capacity.
In the CRM Policies scenario, only Austria has many hours in which the
market cannot be cleared.
Figure 9 shows the flexible capacities in Switzerland in the two scenarios.
Due to the slightly lower market prices and the higher flexible capacities
(stimulated by CRM) in the neighboring countries France and Italy, the total
installed capacity in Switzerland is lower (by 400 MW from 2030) in the CRM
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Policies scenario. However, this does not increase the number of hours, in
which the market cannot be cleared, or the hours when DSM is needed to
successfully clear the market, as more capacities from the neighboring market
areas are available also for the Swiss market.
4.5. Sensitivity analysis for the size of the strategic reserve in Germany
In order to consider other possible developments, an additional scenario
is added and the results are briefly presented in this chapter. In this scenario,
the strategic reserve in Germany is reduced to 2 GW (instead of 5 GW), as
the current regulation allocates a maximum of 2 GW until 2025, however,
maximal 5 GW are legally permissible.
In the scenario, there is hardly any difference in the development of prices
(Figure 10) and capacities (Figure 11) in Switzerland. It is necessary to
compare the results of the model simulations with 2 GW SR in Germany
(DE strategic reserve sensitivity) with those of the CRM Policies scenario, as
no SR is used in the pure EOM scenario and the results would be, therefore,
identical.
With regard to the prices shown in Figure 10, only marginal differences
are identifiable. In the years 2020 to 2022 in particular, a deviation in the
prices is discernible, as the SR in Germany starts in 2020 and capacities are
taken out of the market. Moreover, some years later (around 2044), there
will be further slight differences in annual average wholesale prices. However,
lower than 2.50 EUR/MWh.
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Figure 10: Development of the simulated market clearing wholesale prices in Switzerland
for the CRM Policies scenario and with the reduced SR of 2 GW, which is currently
proposed until 2025.
These minor differences in prices do not affect capacities and incentivize
investments in the scenario. This becomes clear in Figure 11. At the begin-
ning, compared to the CRM Policies scenario higher capacity in Germany,
this does not lower the capacity in Switzerland, since rather old power plants
are allocated to the SR, and old power plants leave the market sooner.
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Figure 11: Capacity development in Switzerland in the DE Strategic reserve sensitivity
scenario and the CRM Policies scenario.
In 2021, the increase in prices in the DE Strategic reserve sensitivity
scenario is caused by the fact that in the scenario with 5 GW SR (CRM
Policies), investments are made promptly due to the higher capacity taken
out of the market and thus the market price falls. In the DE Strategic reserve
scenario, initially no investments are made, but therefore shortages occur in
the market and the prices rise.
Table 6: Cumulated hours with the use of DSM or no market clearing in the simulated
time horizon from 2020 to 2050 in the DE Strategic reserve sensitivity scenario with a SR
of 2 GW.
Unit CH DE FR IT AT
DE 2 GW SR sensitivity scenario
DSM usage [h] 16 144 2 0 81
No market clearing [h] 0 29 0 0 16
Expected load not served [MW] 0 1855 0 0 1097
Table 6 shows the number of hours in which DSM is used and the number
of hours in which the wholesale market cannot be cleared. According to these
36
figures, also no massive differences to the CRM Policies scenario arise. Thus,
the number of hours in which Switzerland has to use DSM for market clearing
increased by 2 to 16 as well as the hours in France also increased by 2, whereas
the hours in Germany and Austria decreased. The increase in France and
Switzerland is due to scarcity in the neighboring countries and therefore,
more electricity had to be exported. The number of hours without market
clearing in Switzerland, France, and Italy remains at 0. In Germany, the
number drops to 29 (from 42 in the CRM Policies scenario). In Austria, the
number of hours decline by one to 16. The decrease in the number of hours
of DSM usage and no market clearing in Germany and Austria is mainly
due to the fact that more capacity will be available in the years after 2020
and the market can therefore be cleared more often without any support of
DSM. The expected energy not served is also declining slightly in Germany
but rises slightly in Austria. In summary, this sensitivity confirms the results
of the CRM Policies scenario.
5. Critical reflection
The scenario analyses presented in this paper are carried out formulat-
ing own assumptions or using best available studies for the uncertain input
parameters, such as the development of the electricity demand, prices for
carbon certificates, and fuel prices for gas or coal. No market data are acces-
sible for a time horizon up to 2050. This is why the EU Reference scenario
(European Commission, 2016) is taken as an input source for the investiga-
tion. However, this input data are only available in steps of 5 years, so that
the intermediate years had to be linearly interpolated. Data about techno-
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logical developments and trends in energy technologies (both conventional
and RES) can only be found to a limited extent.
Further simplifications have been made with regard to the electrical grid.
The domestic grid is not modeled, neither the transmission nor the distri-
bution grid level, only the interconnector capacities are considered by using
NTC values. This means that no grid congestions within a country or other
disturbances in the grid are taken into account, but they may play an impor-
tant role in reality. However, as the study focuses on the balance between
supply capacity and demand at the market area scale, the inner-market area
bottlenecks play a minor role. In contrast, storage expansion, especially
large-scale diffusion of battery storage, can significantly improve generation
adequacy but has not been considered in this study. Our approach follows
the study by Prognos AG (2012) for Switzerland, which does not envisage
any expansion of hydro storage facilities in Switzerland.
Furthermore, some own assumptions had to be made in the CRM mod-
ules, as not all market design details are available for all market areas. For
instance, in the French capacity market, PowerACE does not differentiate be-
tween the obligated parties regarding different demand curve patterns, e.g.,
for sectors or consumers. Beyond that, the participation of foreign power
plants in CRMs is only considered by taking neighboring capacity shares into
account in the security margin parameter. Therefore, future research should
also focus on further design parameter variations and possible cross-border
impacts of alternative designs.
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6. Conclusions and policy implications
As generation adequacy is strongly dependent on investments in flexi-
ble generation capacity, it is monitored continuously with great scrutiny by
regulators. Cross-border effects can strongly influence the investments in
neighboring countries and thereby increase or decrease the level of domes-
tic generation adequacy. Thus, it is essential to assess and anticipate these
effects.
In this paper, changes in the market design of neighboring countries and,
in particular, their effects on a small market area (asymmetric market constel-
lation) are investigated taking the Swiss electricity market as an illustrative
example. Switzerland is largely influenced by surrounding electricity markets
and needs to analyze the political decisions regarding market design changes
and to react to developments in the neighboring countries. The strength of
this influence is studied with the help of an agent-based simulation model
that is applied to two different scenarios describing possible developments
with a time horizon until 2050. The long-term time horizon allows to an-
alyze the generation adequacy not only for the current energy system with
a comparably low share of intermittent renewables but also for a time pe-
riod with very large shares of intermittent sources in the energy system that
may not be available when they are needed in peak demand hours. The
first scenario assumes energy-only markets (EOMs) in all regarded countries,
whereas the second one considers implemented capacity remuneration mech-
anisms (CRMs) in the neighboring countries, but not in the Swiss market.
In general, the model results indicate a strong price increase in the Central
Western European electricity markets, mainly due to rising carbon certificate
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prices and increasing demand. However, the price increase in the CRM Poli-
cies scenario is about 27 EUR/MWh higher in the long term. This is caused
by the introduction of national CRMs with high targets for domestic gener-
ation adequacy, which lead to overall higher installed capacities in the entire
coupled market area. Contrary, in the EOM scenario the capacities are scarce
resulting in price peaks.
Regarding the cross-border effects on the country without a CRM, in
this case Switzerland, it is shown that higher capacities in the neighboring
countries lead to less domestic investments. Therefore in the CRM Policies
scenario, the Swiss market can rely on higher imports from the neighboring
countries. Hence, Switzerland remains dependent on neighboring countries,
although it has a very limited influence on their market design. However,
it also turned out that sufficient capacity is available to serve the electricity
demand in each time step in both scenarios. The reasons for that are large
interconnector capacities and high hydropower capacity in Switzerland. This
means that although there is an influence on prices, the generation adequacy
in Switzerland is not adversely affected by market design changes in neigh-
boring countries.
Regarding the operational revenues of hydropower plants in the Swiss
market, it can be concluded that, as this mainly depends on the development
of wholesale electricity prices, the situation is more favorable in the EOM
scenario than in the CRM Policies scenario. The EOM scenario produces
higher wholesale prices reaching an average annual price of 120 EUR/MWh
in the long term. However, with low operating costs for hydropower and
increasing wholesale electricity prices, it is very likely that the hydropower
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plants can be operated profitable independently from the CRM policies in
the neighboring countries in future. For this reason and due the fact that
generation adequacy is ensured, a change of the Swiss market design is cur-
rently not required in any of the investigated scenarios due to changes in
other markets.
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Appendix A. Bidding strategies for hydro storage power plants
In Switzerland, hydropower accounts for the largest share of electricity
generation (Swiss Federal Office of Energy, 2018b). Analyses of the Swiss
electricity market require an adequate representation of hydropower plants in
an electricity market model. Approximately 16.1 GW of hydropower genera-
tion capacity (with a peak demand in 2017 of 10.9 GW (Swiss Federal Office
of Energy, 2018c)) and a total storage capacity of 8.8 TWh (with 62.9 TWh
total electricity consumption in 2017 (Swiss Federal Office of Energy, 2018c),
see Figure A.12) are available. The hydropower generation capacity (includ-
ing power plants under construction) is divided into 4.6 GW of run-of-river,
3.1 GW of pumped storage plants and 8.3 GW of seasonal hydro storage
plants (Swiss Federal Office of Energy, 2018d).

































Figure A.12: Historical storage volume (green) and the corresponding monthly generation
through water turbines (without pumped storage)
To determine a schedule that maximizes the revenue of seasonal hy-
dropower storages is a complex problem for which different approaches with
varying degrees of detail exist (Hongling et al., 2008). In contrast to the
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operation of a thermal power plant that is based on its variable costs, aris-
ing mainly from the use of fossil fuels and emission allowances, for storage
power plants, the operation depends on opportunity costs, which have to be
determined first. As these costs depend on the future development of several
uncertain factors, such as weather-dependent inflows, but also on demand
and fuel costs (Yakowitz, 1982), both a short-term (days to months) and a
medium-term time (one to five years) horizon must be considered (Steeger
et al., 2014).
Due to the high share of hydropower in Switzerland, it can be assumed
that hydropower does not act as a pure price-taker, but actively influences
market prices, which further complicates the determination of an optimal
schedule. The combination of the long considered periods of time, the mul-
titude of influencing variables, as well as the fact that the optimal schedule
must be determined for every simulated day, lead to the fact that an im-
plementation would exorbitantly increase the computing time of the model.
Therefore, different approaches to the hydropower technologies have been
applied.
The run-of-river power plants were integrated into the model based on
a static generation profile (Swiss Federal Office of Energy (2017) data used
from the year 2015) due to the regular values for monthly generation and
inflexible production over the years. Meanwhile, the pumped storage plants
are modeled as described by (Fraunholz et al., 2017) for an available storage
volume of 10% of the total volume (Swiss Federal Office of Energy (2018c)).
Due to its transparency, a linear regression approach (Equation A.1) is
chosen in order to model the seasonal hydropower in Switzerland. This cus-
43
tom heuristic, in which an optimal use cannot be guaranteed, but which
resembles the historical generation, takes into account the simulated devel-
opments, and at the same time only marginally extends the computing time.
For this purpose, the hourly historical production time series of seasonal hy-
dro storage power plants from ENTSO-E (2018b) for the years 2015 to 2017
are used for this regression.














































Figure A.13: Operation curves historical and fitted of the seasonal hydro storage power
plants.
Parameters
loadm,t : Normalized physical load
RESm,t : Normalized renewable feed-in
netExchangeCH→m,t : Net electricity exchange between
Switzerland and market m
hour t : Dummy for the hour of the day
day t : Dummy for the type of day
V : Storage volume in Switzerland
Sets
s ⊂ S : Season of the year
m ∈ {AT ,CH ,DE ,FR, IT} : Markets
The following influencing factors are examined with the assessment of the
regression: Demand, RES feed-in, weekday or weekend, exchange flows with
neighboring market areas, storage level and hour of the day.
45
Coefficients for these factors are individually estimated for each season.
To account for the increasing capacity of RES, feed-in normalized values
(normalized to the total annual production) are used for the variable RES
feed-in. Equation A.1 describes the regression model. Table C.7 documents
the individual regression coefficients for each season.
The developed regression model and its coefficients are integrated into
the agent-based model. Based on the regression model, the hourly operation
of the seasonal hydropower plants is calculated. In addition, the storage
levels are tracked at any time and in the event of overflow or underrun, the
operation is adjusted accordingly. Taken from the model results, Figure A.13
shows the hourly operation in winter simulated with the regression model
compared with the real operation. As the values of the regression can also
become negative or exceed the possible use, two more limits are introduced
(Equation A.2).
hydroGent = min {hydroGenmax {0, hydroGent}} (A.2)
In addition, further bids will be made to ensure that all the required
capacity is available when needed. These are offered at a high price in the
market (above the most expensive thermal power plant) so that they are
only used in particularly scarce situations and at the same time to ensure
that annual generation does not become too high. In order to compare the
evolution of the simulated storage in 2016 with the historical storage level,
the following is visualized in Figure A.14.
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Figure A.14: Level of the stored water in Switzerland’s storages historically and in the
simulation for the year 2016
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Figure B.15: Total installed capacity in the EOM and CRM Policies scenarios in Switzer-
land and its neighboring countries.
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Appendix C. Regression results
Table C.7: The results of the regression model.
Spring Summer Autumn Winter
Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value
β0 −3055.30 0.00 −2590.32 0.00 −5492.26 0.00 −4413.64 0.00
βStorageCH 0.09 0.12 0.00 0.81 0.20 0.00 0.14 0.00
βloadCH −167.40 0.52 804.49 0.02 −1277.39 0.00 1214.66 0.00
βloadIT 1790.62 0.00 1008.49 0.00 4910.04 0.00 3698.31 0.00
βloadAT −50.24 0.87 1524.15 0.00 −911.18 0.00 −1883.26 0.00
βloadFR 286.56 0.18 2646.13 0.00 3116.91 0.00 2425.81 0.00
βloadCH 4499.44 0.00 1991.39 0.00 2291.99 0.00 2667.61 0.00
βRESDE −116.84 0.00 −1021.53 0.00 −247.18 0.00 62.77 0.05
βRESIT 404.13 0.00 97.66 0.09 112.59 0.03 −94.74 0.19
βRESAT −115.73 0.10 16.22 0.79 −359.64 0.00 −402.61 0.00
βRESFR −647.59 0.00 1083.81 0.00 −348.66 0.00 −396.45 0.00
βRESCH 165.33 0.10 −1275.55 0.00 416.83 0.00 −636.80 0.02
βday −138.07 0.00 −168.58 0.00 −132.65 0.00 −32.66 0.40
β1 −3.81 0.96 95.52 0.23 90.69 0.24 −48.47 0.58
β2 −34.62 0.64 70.11 0.39 145.66 0.06 −6.35 0.94
β3 −74.37 0.32 −65.74 0.43 57.47 0.46 −0.50 1.00
β4 −177.28 0.02 −360.92 0.00 −291.58 0.00 −152.46 0.09
β5 −229.52 0.01 −442.28 0.00 −502.69 0.00 −529.90 0.00
β6 −7.06 0.94 168.08 0.12 −404.29 0.00 −617.49 0.00
β7 −10.04 0.92 496.31 0.00 −284.82 0.00 −488.87 0.00
β8 −226.43 0.03 301.86 0.01 −367.98 0.00 −442.42 0.00
β9 −545.62 0.00 −19.01 0.88 −506.21 0.00 −433.35 0.00
β10 −679.40 0.00 −105.21 0.39 −466.28 0.00 −623.01 0.00
β11 −744.33 0.00 −260.98 0.03 −500.32 0.00 −618.75 0.00
β12 −870.76 0.00 −432.90 0.00 −715.45 0.00 −783.78 0.00
β13 −898.47 0.00 −521.07 0.00 −791.37 0.00 −876.77 0.00
β14 −885.22 0.00 −646.32 0.00 −848.68 0.00 −711.47 0.00
β15 −821.78 0.00 −762.39 0.00 −862.33 0.00 −666.76 0.00
β16s −669.07 0.00 −632.03 0.00 −992.57 0.00 −794.42 0.00
β17s −466.30 0.00 −137.89 0.18 −684.73 0.00 −607.35 0.00
β18s −31.46 0.73 398.74 0.00 −60.35 0.55 −382.03 0.00
β19s 201.34 0.02 416.56 0.00 −23.18 0.80 −303.17 0.00
β20s 102.08 0.21 179.67 0.05 −370.24 0.00 −490.31 0.00
β21s −26.70 0.73 225.86 0.01 −338.67 0.00 −495.46 0.00
β22s −10.79 0.89 −50.66 0.54 −243.20 0.00 −367.96 0.00
β23s −2.43 0.97 16.93 0.83 −98.09 0.20 −196.59 0.03
βNEDE,s −0.32 0.00 −0.11 0.00 −0.37 0.00 −0.32 0.00
βNEAT,s −0.52 0.00 −0.05 0.23 −0.70 0.00 −0.26 0.00
βNEFR,s −0.30 0.00 −0.14 0.00 −0.27 0.00 −0.44 0.00
βNEIT,s −0.24 0.00 −0.09 0.00 −0.38 0.00 −0.28 0.0050
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